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A Look at the Inefficiencies of the U.S. Tort
System and Reforms to Correct Them
Ryan Koopmans
ABSTRACT.  The two goals of tort law are to compensate victims and to deter unsafe
behavior.  This paper judges whether changes are needed in the current system by looking
at how well it meets these goals.  The current system is inefficient and ineffective. Three
reforms are analyzed and suggested: contingency-fee reform, the elimination of punitive
damages for corporations and large business, and the creation of a no-fault system of
compensation for the worst areas of tort law. By enacting these reforms billions of dollars
could be saved, while leaving the goals of tort law intact.
I.  Introduction
The word Tort comes from the Latin word tortus, which means twisted
or crooked. This is ironic since many Americans would describe the U.S.
tort system, and anyone involved in it, as crooked. Everyday stories are
told about plaintiffs winning thousands of dollars in frivolous lawsuits.
For example, a teenager who caught his teeth in a basketball net while
trying to dunk a basketball won $50,000 from the manufacturer of the net
[MDCALA, 2003]. Cases like these have led many Americans to demand
that the tort system be reformed. 
While frivolous lawsuits are a problem in the U.S. tort system, this
paper looks at the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire system,
setting aside the issues of frivolous claims. Two questions will be
examined and answered here. Does the U.S. tort system accomplish its
goals efficiently and effectively? If not, what reforms should be enacted
to create a system better suited for the U.S?
To answer these questions the goals of tort law must be understood.
Tort law has two roles: to compensate victims and to deter unsafe
behavior. Compensating victims serves two purposes. First, society feels
that if someone is harmed in some way then he should be allowed to
recover damages. By using a court of law to recover  damages, victims are
discouraged from seeking retribution in some other form. The second
reason for compensating victims is to encourage them to take the proper
amount of precaution while going through their daily activities. Extremely
high levels of precaution may be inefficient to society. Compensating
someone who was harmed, but took the proper amount of care, is
1
Koopmans: A Look at the Inefficiencies of the U.S. Tort System and Reforms
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 2004
Major Themes in Economics, Spring 200450
therefore beneficial to society. The goal of deterring unsafe behavior is
accomplished by making the injurers pay damages to the victim. Making
the injurers pay damages forces them to internalize the cost they impose
on others and gives them incentives to act to benefit society as a whole.
Damages awarded to victims are of two types, compensatory and
punitive. Compensatory damages are intended to make the victim whole
[Cooter, 1998, 306]. In other words, compensatory damages seek to make
the victim indifferent between having the injury and the damages, and
having neither. Punitive damages are not meant to compensate the victim,
but instead are intended to punish the injurer. 
By examining tort law under the goals of compensation and
deterrence, this paper finds that the current U.S. tort system is inefficient
and ineffective. To correct the problems of the current system three
reforms will be suggested.
II.  Compensation Under the Current System
Knowing the amount of lawyers’ fees and administrative costs that are
incurred when compensating victims allows one to determine the
efficiency of the system. A study by Tillinghast-Towers Perrin [2003],
breaks down the transactions of the tort system into insurance company
administrative costs, defense costs, claimants attorney fees, economic
damages, and non-economic damages.
Figure 1
2
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The total amount of transactions that took place in the tort system in 2003
totaled $233 billion [Tillinghast, 2003]. The results are shown above in
Figure 1.  According to Tillinghast, only $107 billion of the $233 billion1
went towards compensation. Gauging the tort system on the basis of
compensation, the current system is inefficient.
III.  Contingency-Fee Reform
How has our tort system become so inefficient? In recent years much of
the blame has fallen on the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Most plaintiffs’ attorneys
are paid on a contingency basis in tort cases. That is, they are paid a
percentage of their clients’ monetary award. “Since 1960 the effective
hourly rates of tort lawyers has increased 1,000 to 1,400 percent, adjusted
for inflation…” [Brickman, 2003, 655]. It is also not unheard of for
contingent-fee tort lawyers to generate fees amounting to tens of
thousands of dollars an hour [Brickman, 2003, 660]. On average, tort
lawyers are making three times as much as their defense counterparts
[Brickman, 2003, 655]. Still, opponents of contingency-fee reform will
point out that contingent-fee lawyers are not paid if there is no monetary
award and they need to be compensated for that risk. Tort lawyers do take
on risk, but the hourly fees have increased over 1,000 times since 1960
while the overall risk of non-recovery has remained constant
[Brickman,2003, 655].  Risk cannot explain the run-up in claimants’
attorney’s fees. Contingency-fee caps should be put in place.
Contingency-fee caps would limit the percentage a lawyer could take
from claimant’s monetary award and put the hourly rate of tort lawyers
in line with the hourly rate of defense lawyers.
IV. Compensation Under a No-Fault System
Contingency-fee reform opponents also argue that contingency fees allow
individuals access to the civil justice system who would otherwise not be
able to afford it. This argument does hold some weight, but there is a
better way to serve the same purpose. Attorneys’ fees can be eliminated
almost entirely by putting in place a no-fault system of compensation. In
a no-fault compensation system victims do not have to prove any form of
negligence to receive compensation. For example, if someone is injured
on the job, they are entitled to Workers’ Compensation without having to
3
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prove any type of fault. “Workers compensation is a model of efficiency
when compared to the tort system” [Stocker, 2003, 21].  Workers’
Compensation administrative costs, including lawyers fees, are 20 percent
of damages paid to claimants [Stocker, 2003, 21].  The Federal Workers
compensation system is even more efficient. In 2001 total benefits paid
out by the system were $2.2 billion, while administrative costs were only
$109 million, or 4.9 percent of damages paid to claimants [National
Academy of Social Insurance, 2003, 39]. If even 20 percent is a
reasonable percentage of what administrative costs should be, then the
conversion of the entire tort system to a no-fault system would save
almost $100 billion (This figure is found by taking the amount of
damages paid to claimants, $107 billion and multiplying that by 20
percent, which equals $21.4 billion. To calculate the savings, subtract
$21.4 billion from $121.16 billion).
Admittedly, the conversion of the entire tort system into a no-fault
system is unrealistic. There are, however, many cases in which the
implementation of a no-fault system would prove to be effective. Medical
Malpractice litigation, which cost $13 billion in 2002, and provided $11.6
billion in damages to claimants [Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2003, 29] is
one such case. 
Medical malpractice premiums have increased substantially over the
past few years. Rates have escalated rapidly for doctors who practice
internal medicine, general surgery, and obstetrics/gynecology. The
average increase ranged from 11 to 17 percent in 2000 and a more recent
report revealed rate increases are averaging 20 percent per year [U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 12, 2003]. In some states the
increases have been as large as 30 to 75 percent, “although there is no
evidence that patient care had worsened” [U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, 12, 2003]. The large increase in medical malpractice
insurance eventually translates into rising costs of health care. In the hope
of reducing their medical malpractice premiums many doctors practice
defensive medicine–costly precautionary treatments administered with a
minimal expected medical benefit, out of fear of being legally liable if
something happens unexpectedly to the patient [Kessler, 1996, par. 2-3].
While there are no large national no-fault systems for healthcare,
small no-fault systems have existed for two decades. “The first actual
implementation of no-fault for medical liability occurred in the late
1980’s for newborns with severe birth-related neurological impairments
in Virginia and Florida, largely under the Workers’ Compensation model”
4
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[Sloan, 1997, 72]. The goals of the program were to keep liability
insurance available, to prevent the practice of defensive medicine and to
cover the costs of a very needy eligible population [Sloan, 1997, 72]. 
In 1995 Frank Sloan and Peter Rankin compared the cases that passed
through the no-fault system with cases of a similar nature that went
through the tort system in Florida. Since these cases were in the same
state, settled in the same year, and of a similar nature, Sloan and Rankin
were able to effectively isolate the benefits of the no-fault system. 
The results showed that a no-fault system is more efficient than the
tort system. In the no-fault system the average amount of compensation
for each case was $486,324, while administrative costs (including
claimants’ attorney fees) were $55,549 [Sloan, 1997, 94]. Under the tort
system the average amount of compensation was $399,061 and the
administrative costs were $351,837, with the largest percentage,
$199,530, going to pay for the plaintiffs’ attorney fees [Sloan, 1997, 94].
In this instance the no-fault system provided greater compensation, and
total costs averaged $209,025 less per case than in the tort system. The
no-fault cases were also resolved a year faster than most comparable tort
cases [Sloan, 1997, 90]. With 180 people choosing to go through the no-
fault system $37,624,500 was saved in direct cost alone. The likely
decrease in medical malpractice insurance and health insurance premiums
added to the total savings.
A similar no-fault system was set up in 1986 for childhood
vaccinations. Most of the vaccines currently in use to prevent childhood
diseases were developed in a legal environment that protected the
manufacturers from litigation. The environment started to change in the
1970’s and by 1987, 96 percent of the price of the vaccine for diphtheria,
pertussis, and tetanus went towards litigation [Manning, 1994, 248].
Specifically, between 1970 and 1987 the price of the vaccine increased
6,000 percent, largely in response to rising litigation costs [Manning,
1994, 248]. Because of the substantial increase in litigation, insurance
premiums increased. The increase in insurance premiums forced some
vaccine manufactures to stop production, causing U.S. stockpiles to
become dangerously low [Ridgeway, 1999, 61].
In the wake of these events Congress passed the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act in 1986 [Ridgeway, 1999, 61]. The act set up a no-
fault compensation system for children who were harmed by vaccines. As
a result, early childhood vaccination rates have increased, wholesale
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vaccine prices have decreased, and since 1990 no commercial vaccine
manufacturer has ceased production [Ridgeway, 1999, 61].
A no-fault compensation system is a somewhat radical idea, but the
two examples discussed above prove this form of liability system can
efficiently and effectively compensate victims in specific areas of tort
law. The most significant evidence for or against no-fault systems may be
yet to come. Shortly after the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001,
Congress put in place a no-fault system called the Victims’ Compensation
Fund. The main purpose was likely to shield the airlines and other
companies from the barrage of litigation that would follow. In exchange
for compensation the victims give up their right to sue, which may save
many of the already troubled airlines from bankruptcy. Established just
a short time ago, the fund is still paying out awards and there is no
evidence on how effective the system will be. If the fund is successful, it
may become a model for future mass tort cases.
Asbestos litigation is the longest running mass tort in U.S. history
[Carroll, 2002, 1]. Over 600,000 claims have been filed against more than
6,000 defendants [Carroll, 2002, 77]. $23 billion has been awarded to
claimants, but $30 billion has been spent on lawyer’s fees and
administrative costs [Carroll, 2002, 77].  In other words, costs are more
than a $1.30 for every dollar of compensation.   The asbestos cases may
be the most inefficient of all tort cases. The indirect costs may be even
greater than the direct costs. There have been 56 bankruptcies since 1980
due to asbestos litigation. There were sixteen in the 1980’s, eighteen in
the 1990’s and 22 between 2000 and 2002 [Carroll, 2002, 77]. With
companies rapidly filing for bankruptcy, claimants are going after
companies that are further removed from the asbestos and building
products industries that were directly involved. This raises questions of
the deterrence objective of tort law. If companies feel that tort outcomes
have little to do with behavior then they will not act in a way that
minimizes the total costs to society [Carroll, 2002, 86].
Since so many claimants and defendants are involved in asbestos
litigation, government funding will be needed to create a successful fund.
The 9/11 Victims’ Compensation Fund should provide direction on what
works and what does not, for an asbestos fund that is badly needed. Direct
costs savings alone could be in the range of $100 to $132 billion by the
time the last case is resolved [Carroll, 2002, 87].
Some will argue that the establishment of a no-fault system for the
costliest tort cases will increase the number of claims. But to erase the
6
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savings gained by creating a no-fault system the number of cases will
have to double. This is not likely to happen.
V. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages are often the most excessive damages awarded. Their
purpose is to punish the injurer and deter future behavior that is
unfavorable to society. Punitive damages are sometimes defined as
damages “awarded when the defendant’s behavior is malicious,
oppressive, gross, willful and wanton, or fraudulent” [Cooter, 1998, 312].
No official rules exist to guide juries in their decision. The lack of
guidance given to juries leads them to award punitive damages on a
random basis.  In recent years punitive damage awards have been
substantial, running into the millions and in some cases billions of dollars,
yet there is no predictability from case to case [Viscusi, 1998, 285]. 
In 1998 W. Kip Viscusi, a professor at Harvard Univeristy and a
leading figure in law and economics, studied the effect of punitive
damages by comparing the behavior of companies in states that do not
allow punitive damages with the states that do.  He found no evidence of
any deterrence effect and claimed that “this lack of evidence is consistent
with the proposition that punitive damages are random” [Viscusi, 1998,
381]. If punitive damages are random and provide no deterrence effect,
they will act as a tax on companies.  Like any other tax the “tort tax”
creates a deadweight loss for society [Council of Economic Advisors,
2002, 5]. The President’s Council of Economic Advisors report that a
conservative estimate of the deadweight loss incurred by the “tort tax” in
2000 was $24 billion [2002, 12]. Since 2000, total tort costs have
increased almost 30 percent [Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 5, 2003],
increasing the Council’s estimate to $31.2 billion. 
Not everyone shares Viscusi’s view on the purpose and effect of
punitive damages. Professor David Luban of Georgetown University
published an article in direct response to Viscusi’s study. Luban claims
that “the retributive aims of punishment are just as important as its
deterrent aims” [Luban, 1998, 359]. This may be a legitimate argument
when dealing with individuals, but the largest punitive damage awards are
paid by corporations. Corporations are not people who can be punished
for bad behavior. Corporations are made up of shareholders, employees,
and customers. If retribution is a goal of punitive damages then the
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shareholders, employees and customers  will be punished [Viscusi, 1998,
par. 9]. Viscusi points out that even if the responsible employee is
identified, that individual will not suffer the full effects of the punitive
damages award and the employee can simply quit his job to avoid any
repercussions [Viscusi, 1998, par. 9]. The result is that innocent people
who are not responsible for the unsafe decision will suffer the economic
sanction [Viscusi, 1998, par 9].
Luban also thinks there is another reason for punitive damages–they
act like a bounty for the bounty hunter [1998, par. 37]. He argues that the
government cannot efficiently enforce every law, so plaintiffs’ attorneys
act like a private attorney general, or “bounty hunter” [1998, par. 37]. The
idea of the “bounty hunter” is economically sound. Luban’s logic is
flawed, however, when looking at the size of the bounty. For a system to
be efficient resources must be allocated were they are needed the most.
The allocation of $44.27 billion  [Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 19] to tort2
lawyers is not efficient. Whatever marginal benefit punitive damage
awards may have on safety (Viscusi says there is none) is outweighed by
the marginal cost of providing it. Since claimants’ attorney fees make up
a large portion of the cost it seems that the “bounty” is too large.
Besides being random there are other reasons why punitive damages
do not affect behavior. For one, firms are already aware they will have to
pay compensatory damages for any harm they cause. Competition also
forces firms to produce a safe product that benefits society, or they risk
losing market share to other firms. The threat of losing market share to a
competitor may in itself prevent a firm from producing an unsafe product.
While not all tort cases deal with product liability, government regulation
also affects a firm’s actions. Corporations and other companies are
monitored by numerous government agencies.  Through fines and
criminal action, government agencies deter firms from engaging in
activities that are not in the publics’ best interest, lessening the need for
tort law. In fact, regulation in many cases is more efficient and effective
than tort law.
Harvard economists Edward Glaeser and Adrei Shleifer argue that
regulation is more efficient than the tort system for two reasons [2002, 4].
One reason is that subversion is greater in the tort system than in
regulation [Glaeser, 2002, 4]. In Glaeser and Shleifer’s model, subversion
includes such techniques as intimidating or bribing judges and juries, and
using delay tactics to drive up the defendant’s defense costs [2002,4].
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Substantial legal fees may cause the defendant to choose to settle the case
even though they may not be at fault.
Regulation is also more efficient than the tort system because
regulators are more specialized than judges or juries [Glaeser, 2002, 5].
This seems to be an obvious point. For instance, an investigator for the
U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission would have more knowledge
than a judge or a jury as to what products are unsafe for consumers.
Judges hear hundreds of cases a year, most of them having nothing to do
with product liability. Their knowledge of the mechanical workings of a
product is considerably less than someone who looks at consumer
products on a daily basis. A jury may not have any knowledge of the
subject.
Since government regulation is more efficient than the tort system and
because firms are already deterred by the threat of compensatory damage
awards, punitive damages should be eliminated for corporations and
private businesses. Ending punitive damages would eliminate a
substantial amount of the deadweight loss incurred by the “tort tax.”
VI.  Effects of Tort Reform Laws
In 1995 a study was published that compared productivity and
employment in states that enacted tort reform laws with states that did
not. Reforms that limited contingency fees and punitive damages were
among the reforms studied. The authors discovered that states that enact
tort reform laws which reduced liability increase productivity growth in
a broad range of industries.  In contrast, states that enacted laws that
increase liability decrease productivity growth. Similarly, states that enact
laws reducing liability show an increase in employment growth, while
liability increasing laws reduce employment growth [Campbell, 1995,
27]. The industries helped the most were the ones whose products were
produced and consumed in the state enacting the tort reform law. This is
because “the state in which production occurs is the same as the state in
which liability accrues” [Campbell, 1995, 18].
Maybe the most interesting finding of this survey was the effect of
tort reform on the legal industry. In the short run legal fees decrease
slightly, but in the long run the tort reforms benefit the legal industry.
Liability increasing reforms, on the other hand, significantly hurt the legal
industry [Campbell, 1995, 20]. Shocking as this finding may be, it makes
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sense. Lawyers perform a wide variety of tasks in the U.S. economy other
than pursuing or defending tort claims. The increase in productivity will
make the economy better off and the demand for other sorts of legal
services will increase. 
VII.  Politics in Play
The evidence is convincing that tort reform is needed. Specifically, laws
should limit contingency fees, eliminate punitive damages for companies,
and set up no-fault systems for the worst tort cases. So why are state
legislatures and the U.S. Congress so slow to enact these reforms? In the
U.S. Senate two major tort reform laws have been blocked by Democrats
in the past year. One of the reforms would have set up an asbestos
compensation fund for the victims of asbestos related diseases. While
there are many reasons Democrats oppose tort reform bills, the large
campaign contributions of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(ATLA) may be the number one reason.
In 2003, ATLA was the second largest contributor to the Democratic
Party [Center for Responsive Politics, 2004]. In 2002 ATLA was the third
largest contributor to the Democratic Party, and they rank fourth, all time,
as the largest contributor to any political party [Center for Responsive
Politics, 2004]. 
VIII.  Conclusion
Tort law provides a necessary remedy for those who have been injured.
It also provides an incentive for producers to make safe products that
benefit society. The current tort system, however, is not efficient or
effective. The cost of compensating victims is more than the
compensation. Punitive damage awards are unpredictable and do not
provide the proper incentives to producers, resulting in a deadweight loss
to society. The reforms discussed in this paper correct many of the
inefficiencies of the current tort system without lessening the
compensation given to victims. Moreover, government regulation and the
threat of having to pay compensatory damages already gives companies
the incentive to produce products and services that are beneficial to
society. Legislators should enact these reforms into law.
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Endnotes
1. The results of this study have been widely quoted by both proponents and opponents
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of tort reform, suggesting that the analysis of the tort system's cost is informative as
well as objective and unbiased [Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2003,5].  Subsequently,
Tillinghast testified before the U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee as well as
the United States Senate Judiciary Committee in October, 2003 [Tillinghast-Towers
Perrin].
2. Total tort U.S. tort transactions=$233 billion.  Claimants' Attorney fees=19%
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